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Securing Display Path for Security-Sensitive Applications on 
Mobile Devices 
 
Jinhua Cui1, 2, Yuanyuan Zhang3, Zhiping Cai1, *, Anfeng Liu4 and Yangyang Li5 
 
 
Abstract: While smart devices based on ARM processor bring us a lot of convenience, 
they also become an attractive target of cyber-attacks. The threat is exaggerated as 
commodity OSes usually have a large code base and suffer from various software 
vulnerabilities. Nowadays, adversaries prefer to steal sensitive data by leaking the content 
of display output by a security-sensitive application. A promising solution is to exploit 
the hardware visualization extensions provided by modern ARM processors to construct 
a secure display path between the applications and the display device. In this work, we 
present a scheme named SecDisplay for trusted display service, it protects sensitive data 
displayed from being stolen or tampered surreptitiously by a compromised OS. The TCB 
of SecDisplay mainly consists of a tiny hypervisor and a super light-weight rendering 
painter, and has only ~1400 lines of code. We implemented a prototype of SecDisplay 
and evaluated its performance overhead. The results show that SecDisplay only incurs an 
average drop of 3.4%. 
 
Keywords: Mobile device, secure display, virtualization, trusted computing base, display 
path, trust anchor. 
1 Introduction 
Smart devices with ARM processors are now widely used in our daily life. For instance, 
we can use smart phones not only for calling a friend, but also browse websites, take 
photos and buy products. While smart devices bring us a lot of convenience, they also 
become an attractive target of cyber-attacks. Thus, the security of smart devices is one of 
the biggest concerns of users. 
The threat to security is exaggerated as commodity operating systems (OSes) support rich 
functionalities. These Rich OSes usually have a large code base with complicated logic 
and thus suffer various software vulnerabilities. As an OS has higher privilege level than 
user-level applications, the security-sensitive data can be readily leaked once the OS is 
compromised. To protect the sensitive data from being leaked or tampered, various 
                                                     
1 College of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China. 
2 SMU Labs, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178895, Singapore. 
3 College of Mathematics and Informatics, Fujian Normal University, Fuzhou 350117, China. 
4 School of Information Science and Engineering, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China. 
5 Innovation Center, China Academy of Electronics and Information Technology, Beijing 100041, China. 
* Corresponding author: Zhiping Cai. Email: zpcai@nudt.edu.cn. 
  
 
18   Copyright © 2018 Tech Science Press                   CMC, vol.55, no.1, pp.17-35, 2018 
 
schemes [McCune, Li, Qu et al. (2010); Yu, Gligor and Zhou (2015); Sun, Sun, Wang et 
al. (2015); Wang, Chen, Wang et al. (2015); Danisevskis, Peter, Nord-holz et al. (2015); 
Cheng, Ding and Deng (2013); Cheng and Ding (2013); Chen, Garfinkel, Lewis et al. 
(2008); Cho, Shin, Kwon et al. (2016); Azab, Ning, Shah et al. (2014)] have been 
proposed during the past years. Among them, the schemes like Fides [Strackx and 
Piessens (2012)] and Flicker [McCune, Parno, Perrig et al. (2008)] utilize a more 
privileged kernel to counteract the illegal behaves targeting userland applications, but 
these mechanisms can unimpededly be disabled by rootkits residing in kernel space at 
runtime. To this end, schemes based on ARM TrustZone [Sun, Sun, Wang et al. (2015); 
Alves (2004); Winter (2012); Logic (2012); Azab, Ning, Shah et al. (2014); Tian, Wang, 
Liu et al. (2017); Guan, Liu, Xing et al. (2017)] and hardware virtualization [McCune, Li, 
Qu et al. (2010); Yu, Gligor and Zhou (2015); Wang, Chen, Wang et al. (2015); Cheng, 
Ding and Deng (2013); Cheng and Ding (2013); Cho, Shin, Kwon et al. (2016); Eppler 
and Wang (2018)] are proposed. 
TrustZone is designed as a hardware security extension in ARM processors [ARM 
(2010)], it has already been adopted by most trusted execution environment (TEE) 
solutions (e.g. MobiCore (Trustonics) [Logic (2012)], Sierra-TEE [Sierraware (2013)]). 
TrustZone can build a secure world separated from other software layers including the 
hypervisor and Rich OS in the normal world, and can configure a secure physical 
memory space which only can be accessed by the secure world. Therefore, a system 
rooted on TrustZone surely can provide security guarantees on protecting security-
sensitive applications (SecApps). However, the devices providers rarely publish their 
source code placed in TrustZone, thus make security community difficult to do a good 
examination. Moreover, the trusted computing base (TCB) of secure world would 
increment along with the number of kernel modules such as char driver and display driver 
installed in the OS. A bloated TCB may revoke its reliability in security. Furthermore, for 
third-party software developers, it may be an arduous procedure for negotiating with 
OEMs and service providers to place their code into the secure world. 
Recent ARM processors like ARMv7-A and ARMv8-A extend their architectures to support 
virtualization, with which users can efficiently implement a lightweight hypervisor. The 
immediate benefit of hardware-assisted virtualization is that the hardware resources of a 
platform can be separated into two isolated domains, and the domain with higher privilege 
can monitor the activities of the other. Therefore, virtualization has a good availability and 
becomes a popular choice for a platform to fortify its kernel or application security [Wang, 
Chen, Wang et al. (2015); Chen, Garfinkel, Lewis et al. (2008); Jiang and Wang (2007); 
Litty, Lagar Cavilla and Lie (2008); Cho, Shin, Kwon et al. (2016); Azab, Ning, Shah et 
al. (2014)]. Taking Trusted Display [Yu, Gligor and Zhou (2015)] as an example, it relies 
on the underlying micro-hypervisor to mediate accesses to sensitive GPU objects by the 
Rich OS/Apps and emulates these accesses to prevent against arbitrary modifications. 
Nowadays, cyber-attacks targeting smart devices start to steal sensitive data by leaking 
the display content of touchscreen. For instance, screenshot taking attacks [Lin, Li, Zhou 
et al. (2014)] try to obtain the content of display output stored in the frame buffer, on a 
purpose to get SecApp’s security-sensitive output. Moreover, the phishing attacks [Chen, 
Qian and Mao (2014); Bianchi, Corbetta, Invernizzi et al. (2015)] present a dialog on the 
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screen analogous to the user’s SecApp to trick the user into leaking security-sensitive 
information such as login credentials. 
This work mitigates such an attack by providing a trust display service. Because of the 
availability, we exploit the hardware virtualization extensions provided by modern ARM 
processor to build a trusted world for the service. Specifically, SecDisplay relies on a tiny 
hypervisor to create a “secure world” separated from the untrusted OS. SecDisplay 
successfully manage a minimizing TCB by implementing a tiny hypervisor with a super 
light-weight rendering painter. The rendering painter utilizes the character-image to directly 
be rendered (~1400 SLoC), avoiding the need of implementing a full-featured char drivers 
in hypervisor. SecDisplay guarantees that the display content containing the sensitive data 
is securely protected from being read or modified stealthily by malicious OS. 
We implemented a prototype of SecDisplay on Odroid-XU4 QSB equipped with 8 CPU 
cores, and developed a high-level particular application named SecEditor on Android OS 
to demonstrate the usability and reliability of SecDisplay. 
In summary, we make the following contributions in this paper. 
(1) We present a new scheme named SecDisplay to protect the display content from 
being read or tampered by an untrusted OS running on ARM platform. This scheme 
exploits ARM Hardware Virtualization extensions to build a “secure world” isolated 
from the OS kernel, and create a communication channel from SecApp to the display 
device that is only accessible by the secure world. 
(2) We implement a prototype of SecDisplay on Odroid-XU4 QSB with multi-processor 
architecture. The OS is a customized Linux 3.10.9 and Android 4.4.4. The experimental 
results show that our system only incurs 3.4% performance overhead. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a background of 
ARM Hardware Virtualization, the two stages of memory address translation and the 
flow of input and output in the context of a display device. Section 3 describes the threat 
model and assumptions. Section 4 presents the design of our SecDisplay system. We 
elaborate the prototype implementation in Section 5 and evaluate it in Section 6. The 
related work is described in Section 7. Finally, we summarize the paper in Section 8. 
2 Background 
2.1 ARM hardware virtualization overview 
Similar to x86 architecture, ARM virtualization extensions enable the efficient 
implementation of the hypervisor for ARM compliant processors to the latest ARMv7-A 
and ARMv8-A architectures. Instead of introducing an orthogonal feature to distinguish 
between the hypervisor and VM operation, ARM extended the existing CPU mode 
hierarchy, originally just PL0 user mode and PL1 kernel mode, by adding a separate more 
privileged mode called PL2 (also known as Hyp mode) to run the hypervisor. These PLs 
have independent memory address spaces and different privileges. 
Hyp mode has the responsibility of performing trap-and-emulation operations to support 
virtualization in the normal world. It holds its own banked registers, as well as additional 
registers, such as SP, SPSR, and ELR, in which most of critical feature of hardware-
assistant CPU virtualization is executed. Using this register set, the hypervisor software 
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running in Hyp mode can configure hardware to trap into Hyp mode on several sensitive 
instructions and hardware interrupts. 
2.2 Stage-2 translation for memory access controlling 
TTBR0, 
TTBR1
Stage-2 
Page Table
Stage-1 
Page Table
Stage-1 
Translation 
Performed by OS
Physical Memory
VTTBR
Virtual 
Address (VA)
Stage-2 
Translation 
Performed by 
Hypervisor
Intermediate 
Physical 
Address (IPA)
Physical 
Address (PA)
 
Figure 1: Two stage address translation 
In ARM virtualization, ARM provides memory virtualization by adding an extra level 
translation, Stage-2 translation. With Stage-2 translation enabled, ARM defines three 
address spaces: Virtual Addresses (VAs), Intermediate Physical Addresses (IPAs), and 
Physical Addresses (PAs). IPAs are a continuous physical memory space in guest OS’s 
view. Fig. 1 depicts the two-level address translation. VAs in a guest OS are translated to 
IPAs through the Stage-1 page tables managed by guest OS kernel just like non-
virtualized systems. IPAs are further translated to PAs via the Stage-2 page tables 
maintained by the hypervisor. Each CPU core has two TTBR_0/1 (Translation Table 
Base Register) and one VTTBR (Virtual Translation Table Base Register), pointing to the 
Stage-1 and Stage-2 page tables, respectively. While the hypervisor uses a single 
translation that converts VAs to PAs directly based on another Stage-1 page table for PL2 
itself. 
The Stage-2 Translation can only be enabled and disabled in Hyp mode, and the 
hypervisor can flexibly configure which physical memory page needs to be protected 
through setting the appropriate access permission on the Stage-2 page table entry. Thus, 
any illegal accesses to protected memory will trigger page faults and be trapped into Hyp 
mode to handle. 
2.3 The input and output for the display devices 
Smart devices typically have a touch screen and several functional buttons. The screen is 
driven by a display controller. It scans an assigned region of memory, interprets the 
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content as a map of color values and feeds them to the screen. 
More specifically, when an input event is issued by the human user, the touch screen will 
actively trigger a hardware interrupt to CPU and delivery the obtained coordinate 
information to the input buffer mapped into I/O space, then the input driver will further 
be responsible for parsing and handling the event to response the clicked application. For 
the output event, in general, the display controller generates a VSYNC interrupt on the 
start of the vertical sync gap to coordinate the system’s rendering activities. The display 
controller driver, which owns the device and receives that interrupt, forwards it to the 
frame buffer switch which, in turn, passes it onto the active client. After that, the data to 
be displayed on behalf of the application will be computed and composited by GPU and 
the Hardware Compositor, respectively. Accordingly, the frame buffers are populated 
with the blending final pixels, which are transmitted to display device in a DMA channel 
or other much faster channel by updating the display controller registers. 
Moreover, the display controller driver provides an abstraction of the screen. Thereby it 
partitions the screen into several logical regions, the label region (e.g. cursor, caption or 
menu) and the client region (e.g. OS window). Using the display controller’s support for 
multiple scan-out regions or overlays, each of the region may be backed by different 
frame buffers. The driver offers a service to attach arbitrary buffers to the logical screen 
regions and to retrieve information about the region’s geometry and pixel layout. 
3 Threat model and assumptions 
We require that the smart devices where the SecDisplay is deployed support the 
Hardware Virtualization Extension, and that their hardware behaves correctly. We trust 
the code in the Boot ROM where the trust chain is started in the secure world, and the 
former boot code will always verify the integrity of the latter one. The hypervisor 
therefore is securely booted and trusted at runtime. An adversary is able to exploit 
software vulnerabilities to compromise the Rich OS and then obtain the sensitive display 
content. 
We consider that an adversary can leak a SecApp’s security-sensitive output through 
screenshot taking attacks [Lin, Li, Zhou et al. (2014)] whereby the content of display output 
in the frame buffer is read by a malicious program of a compromised Rich OS during 
running SecApp. Besides, the adversary can manipulate the display engine’s data paths and 
overlay a new frame buffer over a SecApp’s display thereby breaking the integrity of 
SecApps’ display output without touching its contents. In addition, the phishing attacks 
[Chen, Qian and Mao (2014); Bianchi, Corbetta, Invernizzi et al. (2015)] that present a 
dialog on the screen analogous to the user’s SecApp may trick the user into giving away 
security-sensitive information such as login credentials. The adversary also could try to 
eavesdrop on the user input and/or output in the process of transmitting the sensitive 
information [Xu, Bai and Zhu (2012); Miluzzo, Varshavsky, Balakrishnan et al. (2012)]. 
In this paper, we assume that the attacker cannot access physical devices or launch local 
physical attacks, such as removing the MicroSD card. We do not consider side-channels, 
device peer-to-peer communication and shoulder-surfing attacks [Hoanca and Mock 
(2005)]. We ignore I/O channel isolation attacks, which have already been addressed in 
prior study [Zhou, Gligor, Newsome et al. (2012); Jiang and Wang (2007)]. We also omit 
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denial of service (DoS) attacks. For example, an adversary might manipulate the display 
controller or GPU configurations to disable screen output. However, for a well elaborated 
SecApp (e.g. SecEditor) it would be difficult to launch a DoS attack that would remain 
unnoticed by an observant user. Data-only attacks [Hu, Chua, Adrian et al. (2015); Hu, 
Shinde, Adrian et al. (2016); Davi, Gens, Liebchen et al. (2017)] that modify the data 
objects are outside the scope of this paper. Other aspects of security requirement [Liu and 
Li (2018); Tang, Liu, Zhang et al. (2018); Huang, Liu, Zhang et al. (2018); Li, Cai and 
Xu (2018); Zhang, Cai, Liu et al. (2018); Sun, Cai, Li et al. (2018); Xia, Cai and Xu 
(2018)] also have no consideration due to weak relevance. 
4 System design 
Fig. 2 shows the SecDisplay architecture. The tiny hypervisor as the trust display anchor 
(TDA) is running under the Rich OS, which has a higher privilege than kernel mode and 
only contain one component: trusted rendering painter. The hardware display device is 
used to render the data entered by the human user via touchscreen. The owning lowest 
privileged particular applications are residing on user mode, which are responsible for 
interacting with the underlying TDA to activate SecDisplay. 
SecApps
Rich OS
Activity 
Window 
Service
Display 
Controller
Surface-
Flinger
Stage-2 
Address 
Translation
Tiny-hypervisor
Device Display
Emulation 
Support
H/W
composer
Memory Map
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DRAM
ROM & RAM & 
I/O
Frame buffer
4 GB
2 GB
1 GB
0 GB
Trusted Untrusted
Rendering 
Painter
 
Figure 2: The architecture of SecDisplay. The tiny hypervisor as the TDA to guarantee 
the security of frame buffer composed by the Rich OS 
4.1 Flushing frame buffer 
As the repainting operation is performed in the hypervisor space and we do not 
implement the related display driver in it to reduce the size of TCB, there exists a 
problem about how to make the data in the new protected frame buffer display on screen 
quickly. The most straightforward approach is that the trusted rendering painter residing 
in the hypervisor helps directly repaint the currently used or next frame buffer to be 
display with the prepared character-image data according to the coordinate stored in the 
input buffer. Nevertheless, during the SecDisplay working, the input buffer is always 
locked, which causes the entire touchscreen fail to respond to any request from the Rich 
OS except for the TDA. Therefore, no any updating operation actively transfers the 
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content of the new frame buffer onto display device. Based on our observation for 
another Raspberry Pi2 board, the display subsystem is not quite complex than Odroid-
XU4, on where the frame buffer update is invoked by display device through forwarding 
a hardware interrupt to CPU that only periodically fetch the pixel data from frame buffer 
onto the display device to display. Thus, the former board can save more time-consuming 
operations and power and display more smoothly but involving in great complexity while 
the latter one is most likely to occur screen tearing phenomenon but always presenting 
the new data in frame buffer onto screen. Theoretically, we should implement a complete 
display driver in the hypervisor space to timely transfer frame data to the display device 
but this will dramatically increase the size of TCB. Instead of designing a complicated 
display driver that has the potential to introduce new vulnerabilities, we made several 
trials below. 
Firstly, according to the display controller specification of the particular board, we 
changed the mappings in SysMMU_DISP1 Page Table that mapped to the physical frame 
buffer for OS window to the previously allocated new frame buffer address, or created 
new mappings for SysMMU_DISP1 Page Table, and then observed that the content of 
the new frame buffer wouldn’t be transferred to the display device to display normally 
after the start and end addresses of display controller registers was exactly configured. 
While non-cacheable memory attribute for the new frame buffer and the relevant TLB 
flushing operations have been enforced, the display content repainted by the TDA still 
did not timely occur on screen until the time updating event arrives. 
Secondly, as ARM only supports tracking memory at the 4 KB or even larger granularity, 
thus, the data structures related to the display controller registers are exactly mapped into 
the same physical page in current setting, which will involve in extra traps into the 
hypervisor once happened any access to the arbitrary address within the specific locked 
page. Moreover, the number of display controller registers is a little more (~18), thus, if 
we only enable Stage-2 translation lock the physical page that contains the related 
registers of display controller, and then help emulate these traps according to the 
syndrome information stored in different syndrome registers (e.g. HSR, HPFAR and 
HDFAR) and repaint the frame buffer to be displayed in the hypervisor when updating 
the controller registers by the display driver, the overhead of iterative context switching 
between SVC and HYP mode will incur much more performance loss. 
Therefore, in order to possibly not introduce too much performance overhead or not 
implement a new display driver in the hypervisor, we make a trade-off between 
performance and generality for flushing frame data to display device, where we chose to 
perform the frame buffer updating by invoking the userland android element invalidation 
interface function from the SecApp. Specifically, we create a dedicated thread to call the 
invalidation function in polling way, when the TDA is initialized completely, the update 
status will be set through an installed system call module. At this moment, the TDA does 
not touch any data in current frame buffer until the touchscreen events are triggered by 
the human user, where arbitrary access to the protected input buffer from the Rich OS 
will cause the page fault which is directly delivered into the TDA in HYP mode by 
hardware. At the same time when the TDA detected the update status, it will immediately 
repaint the frame buffer allocated for OS window with the character image based on the 
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parsed coordinate in the input buffer. 
Because only repainting one frame buffer will occur flickering phenomenon without the 
particular character-image data in the other two frame buffers, our implementation will 
firstly repaint the shadowing frame buffer and then copy them to all three frame buffers 
for OS window when invoked update event in polling thread. While the content in frame 
buffers may be flushed away due to from the external update events, as the touchscreen is 
always locked during its working and our SecApp is set to full screen mode, the repainted 
frame buffers will not be polluted or overwritten. 
The frame buffer to be flushed out onto screen that contains the sensitive data can be read 
or tampered stealthily by the Rich OS, so we exploit Stage-2 translation to constrain such 
malicious access. Furthermore, considering that GPU also access the frame buffer 
through SysMMU_DISP1 Page Table. Theoretically, we can make the TDA verify the 
integrity of the SysMMU_DISP1 Page table to counteract this attack from GPU side. 
However, since the page table for display device is frequently modified to create the new 
frame buffer or release the old one, we cannot simply shield it in current setting. 
4.2 Quick rendering 
Although GPU is quite efficient at accelerating the creation of images in a frame buffer 
intended for output to a display device, it still needs to occupy a certain number of time 
slices to render, composite and copy to the frame buffer. To this end, we elaborately 
devise a series of character images for output and a dedicated soft keyboard for input. 
Each piece of character image is derived from their complete screenshots through 
dumping the data of the specific character area from the frame buffer into file. Similar to 
the hard keyboard on PC or mobile phone, the particular keyboard contains a set of 
common English characters except the special ones. 
With previously prepared input and output resources, it is unnecessary for the TDA to 
implement a complete functional display driver in the hypervisor space that will 
dramatically increase the size of TCB. As a result, the trusted rendering painter only need 
to copy the according character-image data loaded into memory to the current frame 
buffer when the human user clicks a character on the dedicated soft keyboard. 
Accordingly, such an operation will enable the sensitive data in frame buffer be quickly 
rendered onto the display device. Considering that these character images used for output 
may be tampered by the Rich OS, we put them into the specific memory blocks that are 
protected against malicious OS access through the Stage-2 memory translation. For the 
simplicity of implementation, we load these character images with hypervisor image 
together into the memory region allocated to the hypervisor space during SecDisplay’s 
initializing phase, wherein the integrity is also verified to strictly ensure their security. 
4.3 TDA: Trust Display Anchor 
Instead of implementing a complicated display driver in the hypervisor, we utilize the 
TDA as the function module to achieve a series of goals of protecting those elaborated 
character images, locking the input buffer allocated for touchscreen, handling the page 
faults and repainting the frame buffer, etc. 
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4.3.1 Locking the input buffer 
The input buffer register as a unit of touch screen controller that is mapped into MMIO 
space is charge of storing or collecting the coordinate information from touchscreen 
sensor. When the human user presses down on the touchscreen, the sensor processor unit 
will forward the computed coordinate into the mapped input buffer which will further be 
read by OS kernel to handle the touchscreen events. In order to obtain the coordinate 
prior to the Rich OS, the TDA sets the physical page containing the input buffer to non-
accessible through the Stage-2 translation to forbid any malicious access during 
SecApp’s working. The DMA-based attacks can be prevented by verifying the integrity 
of the SMMU page tables but, in practical, the frequent modifications to those page tables 
by OS may make it incompetent. 
4.3.2 Handling page faults 
After finished locking the input buffer, any read or write operations will trigger the page 
faults that will be forwarded into the handler of offset 0×14 of the exception base address 
of the hypervisor vector table to further handle. In exception handler, we parse the 
coordinate information fetched from the input buffer into x, y values. According to the 
coordinate we determine the position of the character clicked by the human user on the 
particular soft keyboard displayed on screen based on the previously computed range of x 
and y values, as shown in Tab. 1. Once obtained the knowledge of the position of the 
clicked character, we will accordingly located the in-memory character image to repaint 
the frame buffer. After handling the exception, the TDA will perform the ERET 
instruction to switch back to SVC mode to continue executing the following instructions. 
With the design of ARM processor pipeline, we have to add the offset of 4 bytes to 
ELR_hyp register to avoid trapping into the hypervisor again. 
Table 1: A small protion of coordinate range based on the elaborated soft keyboard 
Characters 
Coordinate Range 
Upper-left to Lower-right 
0 
1 
2 
a 
b 
c 
done 
delete 
(1194, 446)~(1282, 488) 
(24, 446)~(112, 488) 
(154, 446)~(242, 488) 
(93, 609)~(185, 655) 
(724, 685)~(814, 735) 
(469, 685)~(563, 735) 
(24, 685)~(182, 735) 
(1103, 685)~(1248, 735) 
4.3.3 Repainting for frame buffer 
In our current design of SecEditor application, a right-size bar located at the top of screen 
is used to display the sensitive data, accordingly, and the mapped areas in the frame 
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buffer are protected from any malicious access. The trusted rendering painter as a part of 
TDA is charge of repainting the bar with the clicked character images. Benefiting from 
our previously elaborated 38 pieces of images, we only directly copy the corresponding 
image data into the frame buffer instead of spending much more time computing and 
compositing the final pixels by GPU and hardware compositor, respectively. However, 
this also introduces the issue of generality that the right-size character images for 
different screen resolution need to be redesigned. Comparing to the great enhancement to 
the performance and security, we chose to match the new device through providing a 
simple versatile tool to produce the matchable images. 
5 Implementation 
We implement a SecDisplay prototype using Odroid-XU4 quick start board (QSB). 
Odroid-XU4 is equipped with four big cores (ARM Cortex-A15 up to 2.0 GHz) and four 
small cores (ARM Cortex-A7 up to 1.4 GHz) with 2 GB LPDDR3 RAM, and supports 
boot from an eMMC5.0 HS400 Flash Storage or a MicroSD card. The touchscreen we 
use is Odroid-VU HDMI LCD Display, a 9-inch 1280×800 (WXGA) display with 10-
points capacitive touchscreen. Besides, 2×USB 3.0 Host used for faster communicated 
with the peripherals are also integrated. We run Android 4.4 KitKat with Linux 3.13 on it. 
To demonstrate the usability and reliability of our system, moreover, we elaborated a 
high-level particular application that provides a reliable user input/output interface to 
ensure the security of the display content. In specific, we will present our implementation 
as follows. 
5.1 Slightly instrumenting to the display driver 
To quickly flush the content in the repainted frame buffer to the display device, we 
slightly modify the source code of the display driver through inserting a stub to check 
whether the flag of updating the frame buffer is met. When the human user touches the 
characters on touchscreen via the particular soft keyboard in SecEditor, the page faults 
will be triggered as the Rich OS tries to read the locked input buffer. In the page fault 
handler, the TDA will put a global flag into memory to inform the updating thread in 
SecEditor to invoke the invalidation function of frame buffer. At the same time, another 
flag for the display driver is also put into memory through the system call interface. Once 
the instrumented code in the display driver detected the flag set by the updating thread, it 
will invoke the HVC call instruction to repaint the currently used frame buffer using the 
prepared character images in the hypervisor. Otherwise, it will branch to the original flow 
of execution of the display driver. 
SedDisplay made a couple of modifications on the OS driver. However, it does not mean 
SecDisplay is not a practical solution. SecDisplay is compatible with legacy programs, 
even though a program does not need protection, it can still run on the OS modified by 
SecDisplay. 
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Figure 3: Snapshot of SecEditor based on the SecDisplay 
5.2 Repainting based on character image 
To quickly display the character clicked by the human user onto screen, we elaborate the 
common character images instead of producing them via complicated GPU computing 
and compositing. As is shown in Fig. 3, each character on the top of the picture is 
composed of a piece of image of suitable size. The 38 pieces of images are derived from 
their complete screenshots through dumping the data of the specific character area from 
the frame buffer into file. Thus, when a character needs to be displayed, we only directly 
copy the corresponding image data into the frame buffer. 
Besides, we load these character-image data into the specific memory blocks during 
initializing the system and verify their integrity to prevent any runtime attacks from 
maliciously accessing them. Note that when we perform these operations in the TDA, the 
temporary variables in stack may be asynchronously modified by other CPUs due to 
running on multi-core platform, thus, the push or pop operation to save or restore the 
context is most likely to lead to crashing the OS. To this end, we allocate the stack 
memory for each core and cautiously maintain them. 
5.3 Filtering out multi-touch noise 
In virtue of different single-touch technology on the display device, when happened to 
pressing down only one time on the touchscreen, more than one touch events can be 
tracked down and repeatedly handled in the TDA. This severely constrains the 
performance of SecDisplay. Based on our prior study to touchscreen driver in Linux 
kernel, the driver will filter out redundant touch events triggered by the human user 
through setting a time threshold that is used to drop the events beyond the value. 
Similar to the operation performed by the OS kernel, we estimate and adjust the time 
threshold to filter out the redundant touch events and further avoid the higher overhead 
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from repeatedly repainting the frame buffer for the same touch event. To generalize our 
design and improve the user experience, only the region belonging to the particular soft 
keyboard will handle the page faults while the remainder including the gap between the 
characters on the keyboard and the blank areas on the top of the keyboard will has no any 
response. 
6 Performance evaluation 
In this section, we evaluate the proposed system. First, we measured the time required to 
identify coordinates, repaint shadowing frame buffer, copy frame data to three frame 
buffers and so on during the system initialization. Secondly, besides these micro-
benchmarks, we also conducted the macro-benchmarks. Specifically, we use Android 
Vellamo (Version 3.2.6) and CF-bench (Version 1.3) benchmarks to evaluate the overall 
performance impact of the trust display service on the OS/Apps software. Finally, we 
show the code size of TCB and all major prototype components in SecDisplay. All the 
experiments were repeated 20 or more times and the average results are reported here. 
6.1 Performance on micro-benchmarks 
The runtime overhead incurred by SecDisplay includes the hypervisor interceptions or 
hypervisor calls and the CPU time spent by the hypervisor’s execution. To evaluate the 
former cost, we measure the turnaround time of an empty HVC call which causes the 
CPU to trap into the HYP mode and return immediately. Our experiments show that the 
average cost for a round-trip mode switch is around 86 CPU cycles on our board. For the 
latter cost in the hypervisor, identifying the coordinate clicked by user on touchscreen, 
locating and repainting the shadow frame buffer and copying the data in shadow buffer 
into the frame buffers will take a bit of time. The overhead increases around 16 
milliseconds on average, as is shown in Tab. 2. 
Table 2: The relative time of code execution in SecDisplay, in millisecond 
Identifying coordinates ~0.002 
Repainting shadow frame buffer ~0.298 
Copying to frame buffer ~15.63 
6.2 Performance on macro-benchmarks 
We use two Android benchmarks Vellamo and CF-bench to evaluate the system-wide 
performance impact of SecDisplay on the Rich OS/Apps. Vellamo includes two test 
items: Multicore and Metal while CF-bench actually involves in more, wherein we chose 
two representative benchmarks: Native and Java. The Multicore on Vellamo extensively 
measures floating point computing, memory r/w speed, system call operations, Binder 
IPC and so on, and the Metal mainly aims at CPU performance and networking 
capabilities. CF-bench is used to measure the performance overhead of DRAM and flash 
storage in Native and Dalvik environment, respectively. The results are shown in Tab. 3, 
the higher score means the better performance. The overhead on the overall system 
performance is quite small. 
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Table 3: Performance of the trust display service on Vellamo and CF-bench (higher 
score is better) 
 SecDisplay  
Off 
SecDisplay  
On 
Performance 
loss (%) 
Vellamo 
Multicore 
Metal 
 
963.7 
475.5 
 
949.1 
459.6 
 
1.5 
3.3 
CF-bench 
Native 
Java 
Overall 
 
21802.9 
5613.2 
12088.6 
 
21230.1 
5303.6 
11673.7 
 
2.6 
5.5 
3.4 
As aforementioned explanation, when SecDisplay is enabled, the extra Stage-2 
translation will occur on every memory access. Therefore, the time spent on the address 
translation should be doubled theoretically while the impact is also aggravated 
accordingly. However, as MMU’s TLB caches every mapping that previously has been 
translated and the data cache and instruction cache also have been enabled for frequent 
cache hits, the performance loss is still small. In addition, the context switch, TLB 
invalidation, identifying coordinate and copying the data into the frame buffers also will 
introduce a certain amount of performance drop, but the measurement results are almost 
same as off SecDisplay. The reason lay behind that is the two benchmarks never have 
access to any protected memory (e.g. the input buffer) which will trigger page faults to 
trap into the hypervisor to handle. 
6.3 TCB size 
In SecDisplay, the tiny hypervisor is the TCB of the trust display service. To estimate the 
safety of SecDisplay in terms of TCB size, we counted the number of source lines of our 
prototype. As is shown in Tab. 4, the SecDisplay hypervisor only consists of <190C 
SLoC and <1,400 assembly SLoC, therefore, SecDisplay has a smaller TCB than the 
previous works [McCune, Li, Qu et al. (2010); Yu, Gligor and Zhou (2015); Danisevskis, 
Peter, Nordholz et al. (2015); Cho, Shin, Kwon et al. (2016); Azab, Ning, Shah et al. 
(2014)]. Moreover, we also show the statistic of other components, such as the 
instrumented display driver with 90 SLoC totally, the system call interface comprising of 
162 SLoC for interacting with kernel, and the high-level SecApp including java and 
native code with 223 SLoC. 
Table 4: Code size in SecDisplay (in SLoC). The numbers of assembly code lines are in 
the brackets  
Tiny hypervisor Instrumented drivers Two syscalls interface SecEditor 
183 (1378) 90 162 223 
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7 Related work 
7.1 Virtualization-based security 
The immediate benefit of virtualization is that the hardware resources of a platform can 
be partitioned two isolated domains, and the domain with higher privilege can monitor 
the activity of the other. This mechanism has been explored by a diverse of fields 
including malware analysis [Dinaburg, Royal, Sharif et al. (2008)], kernel rootkits 
detection and prevention [Li, Wang, Jiang et al. (2010); Riley, Jiang and Xu (2008, 
2009)], virtual honeypot [Jiang and Wang (2007)], system security enhancement [Wang, 
Chen, Wang et al. (2015); Chen, Garfinkel, Lewis et al. (2008); Jiang and Wang (2007); 
Litty, Lagar-Cavilla and Lie (2008); Cho, Shin, Kwon et al. (2016); Azab, Ning, Shah et 
al. (2014); Shen, Li, Su et al. (2018)], etc. 
In particular, virtualization is a popular choice of platforms to fortify the kernel or 
applications security. For instance, Patagonix protects the kernel code integrity through 
virtualization-based code identification [Litty, Lagar-Cavilla and Lie (2008)], while 
HookSafe further addresses the protection granularity problem through systematic hook 
redirection [Wang, Jiang, Cui et al. (2009)]. Meanwhile, Overshadow is designed to 
protect the secrecy of the user data in memory even if the kernel is completely 
compromised [Chen, Garfinkel, Lewis et al. (2008)]. 
Trusted Display [Yu, Gligor and Zhou (2015)] and Graphical User Interface [Danisevskis, 
Peter, Nordholz et al. (2015)] are two approaches based on virtualization to assure the 
confidentiality and authenticity of content output by SecApp and thus prevent a 
compromised Rich OS or application from surreptitiously reading or modifying the 
displayed output. More specifically, the former one mainly provides trusted display on 
commodity platforms that use modern graphics processing units (GPUs). The latter one 
provides a trusted and identifiable input and output path between the user and a VM. 
Hardware virtualization-based systems are trustable due to their smaller code base and 
attack surface. However, the bloated code base of modern hypervisors and recent attacks 
put this assumption into question. This problem is much more serious as a system 
providing trusted display service needs to support complexity interoperations among 
several hardware components. Therefore, in this work, we proposed a system with very 
small code base to provide trusted display. 
7.2 Trusted display with other techniques 
Several previous approaches provide trusted display services through fortifying the OS 
kernel, such as Nitpicker [Feske and Helmuth (2005)] and Trusted X [Epstein, McHugh, 
Pascale et al. (1991)]. Glider [Sani, Zhong and Wallach (2014)] also could be used to 
provide a trusted display service since it isolates GPU objects in the kernel. However, 
these approaches extensively modified the OS kernel. Past research efforts to restructure 
unmodified OSes to support high-assurance security services were failed to meet 
stringent marketplace requirements on timely availability and maintenance. Moreover, 
the Rich OS always has a complicated code base and thus potentially contains a number 
of software vulnerabilities. 
Other approaches provide trusted display by exclusively assigning GPU to SecApp. 
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Recent implementations of trusted path [Zhou, Gligor, Newsome et al. (2012); Zhou, Yu 
and Gligor (2014)] isolate communication channels from SecApp to GPU hardware. 
However, once assigned to a SecApp, the GPU cannot be accessed by the Rich OS/Apps 
until the device is re-assigned to them. Thus, the Rich OS/Apps cannot display their 
content during SecApp’s exclusive use of the trusted display. 
Meanwhile, GPU virtualization can provide trusted display services by running SecApps 
in a privileged domain and the Rich OS/Apps in an unprivileged domain. The privileged 
domain can emulate the GPU display function in software [Steinberg and Kauer (2010)] 
for the Rich OS/Apps. However, some GPU functions, such as image-processing 
emulation, are extremely difficult to implement in software due to their inherent 
complexity [Tian, Dong and Cowperthwaite (2014)]. As a result, GPU emulation cannot 
provide all GPU functions to the Rich OS/Apps, and hence this approach is incompatible 
with commodity software. A mitigation solution named Smowton [Smowton (2009)] 
paravirtualizes the user-level graphics software stack to provide added GPU functions to 
the Rich OS/Apps. Unfortunately, this type of approach requires graphics software stack 
modifications inside the Rich OS/Apps, and hence is incompatible with commodity OS. 
Basically, these techniques targets for x86 platform while leaving ARM untouched. 
Particularly, TrustZone technology on ARM is extensively applied to security enhancement. 
TZ-RKP [Azab, Ning, Shah et al. (2014)] leverages the Security Extension to protect the 
kernel running in the normal world. Specifically, it instruments the original kernel to 
prevent it from executing certain privileged instructions or updating page tables. These 
operations instead must be handled by the secure world. Certainly, TrustZone technology 
can also protect the display content for the SecApp which typically runs in the secure 
world avoiding any interference from the normal world. However, the closed source to 
TrustZone code makes the research and implementation difficult without any external 
collaboration. 
Some cryptography-based approaches [Yamamoto, Hayasaki and Nishida (2004)] decode 
concealed display images via optical methods; for instance, by placing a transparency, 
which serves as the secret key, over concealed images to decode them. These approaches 
are similar in spirit to the use of one time pads, and hence need physical monitor 
modification for efficient, frequent re-keying. Other systems [Oikonomakos, Fournier 
and Moore (2006); Yuan, Li, Wu et al. (2017); Pradeep, Mridula and Mohanan (2017)] 
add decryption circuitry to displays, and hence also require commodity hardware 
modification, which fails to satisfy design requirements. 
8 Conclusion 
In this work, we have proposed a trust display scheme named SecDisplay. It utilizes the 
hardware virtualization extensions provided by modern ARM processors to protect the 
display output from being stolen or tampered stealthily by a compromised OS. 
SecDisplay successfully maintains a minimal TCB while secures the display path 
between security-sensitive applications and display devices. The design of SecDisplay is 
fully compatible with commodity hardware, applications, OSes and the display drivers. 
We implemented a prototype of SecDisplay on Odroid-XU4 QSB, and elaborated a 
SecApp named SecEditor to demonstrate the usability and reliability of SecDisplay. The 
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performance evaluations conducting on both micro-benchmarks and macro-benchmarks 
show a negligible overhead. 
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